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International Norm Diffusion in the Pimicikamak Cree Nation:
A Model of Legal Mediation
Galit A. Sarfaty†
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. (2007, forthcoming)
INTRODUCTION
Over 1000 people from across the globe convene in Geneva, Switzerland
every summer to voice their concerns on indigenous rights. This pilgrimage to
the week-long United Nations (U.N.) Working Group on Indigenous Populations
has taken place every year since its inception in 1982, when only about thirty
people attended. The increasingly global nature of political activism among
indigenous peoples is evident in the growing number of participants at the
Working Group,1 the U.N.’s recent creation of a Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues to advise its Economic and Social Council,2 and the adoption of the U.N.
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the Human Rights
Council in 2006.3 The language of human rights has become a platform for
†
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See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996); Chris Tennant,
Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions, and the International Legal Literature from 19451993, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1994).
2
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http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh67.htm.
3
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organizing the international indigenous movement. Its rhetoric has enabled
indigenous peoples to claim legitimacy for their campaigns for political,
economic, and cultural autonomy. Political mobilization around rights claims has
publicized the plight of indigenous peoples, from the Kayapó of Brazil to the
Maori of New Zealand, and has given them a common voice with which to unite
on a global level and lobby for domestic policy change.
Yet, what happens when these indigenous peoples return to their
communities after having learned, employed, and even influenced international
norms? Do they adapt local laws in relation to the international norms that they
have internalized? For many decades, local communities like indigenous groups
have been using the moral authority and persuasive power of international law as
leverage against states. They have appropriated the global legal discourse of
human rights as a tool for empowerment. But local groups do not just absorb
international norms or redeploy them against states; they are also transformed by
these norms in a variety of ways, particularly, in their laws and governing
institutions. The issue is: How are localities transformed by their contact with
international norms? When an indigenous community is exposed to international
human rights law (e.g., through a local NGO or their own participation in an
international campaign), how does that affect its local customs and laws,
including its negotiation with states? Ethnographic studies of local law-making
within communities are needed to examine the micro-level mediation process
among local, state, and international law.
Scholars have analyzed the diffusion of international norms across
borders, but they tend to focus on states rather than localities. There is a gap in
the legal scholarship on how norms are translated on the local level. International
legal scholars have described the transnational legal process whereby
transnational actors interact and cause international norms to become internalized
into domestic structures.4 They have also analyzed how international law changes
state behavior, through legal means like treaty ratification or social forces like
acculturation.5 Political scientists have explained how transnational advocacy
networks use international law to pressure states, and thus create a boomerang
effect towards domestic policy change.6 They have also described how state
4

See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (review
essay).
5
See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
6
See MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
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governments become socialized to conform to international human rights norms.7
But what happens on the local level, when international norms become
internalized in local legal systems? That is, how do communities give meaning to
international norms in relation to state and local laws?
In an effort to address these inquiries, this Article examines the process of
international norm diffusion on the ground—where international law is shaping
how local actors construct their laws and legal institutions. Based on empirical
evidence, I analyze how international norms can become embedded in an
indigenous community and influence its law-making in a way that mediates
between state and local laws. International norms can provide a mechanism not
just for domestic reform, but also for local reform. Local actors may design
innovative governing structures that borrow from state and international law while
also adapting cultural norms.
I elaborate on this process of legal mediation by presenting a case study of
the Pimicikamak Cree Nation (pronounced “Pi-mi-chi-ca-mak”), an indigenous
people living in Cross Lake, a small town in Manitoba, Canada. This study is
based on my ethnographic field research at the Cree reservation in 1999 and 2000,
as well as follow-up research in the years since that time.8 Having suffered from
the destructive effects of a hydroelectric dam constructed in the 1970s, the Cree
have actively lobbied the Canadian government for the compensation promised to
them over 25 years ago. Since 1998, they have appealed to the U.N. to pressure
Canada and have invoked international law to assert their right to selfdetermination. As part of this process, the Cree have developed a unique
government as a basis for their new relationship with Canada––one that demands
respect for their fundamental human rights, while also incorporating aspects of
Canadian law and adapting customary Cree law.9

7

See THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Risse et
al. eds., 1999) (constructing a five phase “spiral model” of socialization to international human
rights norms).
8
During my field research, I compiled data from semi-structured interviews, analysis of
government documents in Cross Lake and Winnipeg, and visits to the United Nations in Geneva.
9
My use of the terms “custom” and “customary law” refers to the de facto habits that have
developed in a people’s practices and institutions, based on a group’s cultural traditions. It does
not imply that there exists an authoritative expression of a people’s culture. While I often refer to
the Cree Nation as a collectivity with customary practices and laws, I recognize that there exists a
multiplicity of perspectives within the group that I am not able to fully account for. Thus, my
discussion of the Cree does not presuppose a single ethnic identity. It is a construction based on
my personal encounters with different community members and my approximation of internal
differences.
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By designing a government that integrates Canadian and international law
into their own legal institutions while also adapting Cree cultural norms, the Cree
are engaging in legal mediation. This process describes a web of overlapping
identifications with the local, state, and international legal spheres. Yet legal
mediation refers to more than just an interaction between multiple legal orders in
the same social field, referred by some scholars as “legal pluralism.”10 It
describes a process of negotiation among multiple normative commitments and
legal entities. Under legal mediation, local actors play an important role in
shaping how international norms become internalized within their communities.
They influence how international human rights norms are received and
incorporated in local institutions, and how they interact with state and non-state
norms (e.g., religious norms or cultural practices).
The case of the Cree thus demonstrates how the global discourse of human
rights is becoming incorporated into local communities as indigenous peoples are
“redefining their projects in the global space of . . . human rights.”11 Their
strategic use of human rights discourse is indicative of the growing role played by
international law in their societies. International human rights law gives them
political leverage when negotiating with the states in which they reside. It has
also led groups like the Cree to adapt their customary law to accommodate their
relationship to other legal institutions. The dialectical process of legal mediation,
whereby indigenous groups shift between different normative communities,
represents their multi-layered identifications within the local, state, and
international spheres.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews existing
literature from international law and international relations on norm diffusion and
internalization. I identify the gaps in the literature, including how norm
internalization occurs in local settings. I then argue that ethnographic studies can
shed light on these local processes, particularly how international human rights
norms can shape law-making in local communities. When analyzing these
processes, theories of legal pluralism provide useful insights. I review
scholarship on legal pluralism and then build on these theories to discuss the
model of “legal mediation.” Under this model, local actors are able to mediate
10

See, e.g., BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995); John Griffiths, What is Legal
Pluralism?, 24 J. LEG. PLURALISM 1 (1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988); Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism,
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1992).
11

Michael Kearney, The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and
Transnationalism, 24 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 547, 560 (1995).
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between local law and state law by borrowing from international law. As I
describe in Part I.B, communities, particularly indigenous groups, are also
lobbying state and international institutions to recognize local norms and
customary practices. Thus, not only are multiple types of legal norms interacting
within local settings, but they are also shaping and being shaped by one another.
Finally, I analyze how indigenous peoples are adapting their local laws as they
internalize international norms.
Part II offers ethnographic evidence of the diffusion of international norms
in a local community. I first set out a brief narrative of the Pimicikamak Cree
Nation, including the historical events that spurred its appeals to the U.N. This
case study exemplifies an indigenous people that is appealing to international law
to win compensation from a state government and to assert its right to selfgovernment. As they speak the language of international human rights law, the
Cree are promoting their use of customary law as a legitimate basis for their
political autonomy. I then describe how the Cree are participating in transnational
advocacy networks for indigenous rights and the environment. Lastly, I discuss
how they are asserting their right as a people to self-determination, which they
interpret as an on-going negotiation between multiple normative communities.
In Part III, I analyze the Pimicikamak Cree Nation’s recently adapted local
government as an example of legal mediation. I first describe how the Cree are
preserving cultural norms as they assert their right to self-government. I then
analyze how they have adapted these norms to accommodate state laws, and have
incorporated international norms into their official communications and local
political discourse. Finally, I identify possible external and internal obstacles to
legal mediation as I consider the ways in which this model could be most
effectively utilized by local communities.
I. LOCALIZING THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL NORM DIFFUSION
Legal scholarship on international norm diffusion, including the
development, circulation, and internalization of norms, has traditionally focused
on states and how international law shapes state behavior. Analyses of norm
internalization have been mostly limited to state legal systems. For example,
transnational legal process theory examines the interface between international
norms and domestic legal processes in an attempt to answer the question of why
nations obey international law.12 The theory outlines three phases: interaction,
12

See, e.g., Michael B. Likosky, Introduction to TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES:
GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES xxiv (Michael B. Likosky ed., 2002); Sally Falk Moore,
An International Legal Regime and the Context of Conditionality, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
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interpretation, and internalization. “Those seeking to embed certain norms into
national conduct seek to trigger interactions that yield legal interpretations that
are then internalized into the domestic law of even resistant nation states.”13 Yet,
as one scholar recently noted, “more is needed to fully flesh out the idea of
transnational legal process in order to see how norm internalization actually takes
place outside of the official organs of government.”14 That is, how does norm
internalization occur in local settings?15
Existing literature in international relations similarly emphasizes the
spread of norms from transnational and international actors to states.16
Constructivist theories treat transnational actors and their interests as
“constructed” by their social context.17 By shaping that context, “[t]he
international system can change what states want.”18 These accounts, however,
do not adequately describe how transnational ideas shape local communities. One
of the prominent theories in international relations is that of Martha Finnemore
and Kathryn Sikkink. According to their theory, the life-cycle of norms consists
of three stages: norm emergence, norm acceptance (or what is termed a “norm
cascade”), and norm internalization.19 The first stage is characterized by
persuasion of states by “norm entrepreneurs”; the second by socialization of states
to become norm followers; and the third by wide acceptance of norms and their

PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES 333 (Michael B. Likosky ed., 2002); Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, supra note 4; Koh, Why do Nations Obey International Law?, supra
note 4; Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S. “War on
Terrorism,” 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 47 (2004).
13
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 337, 339 (2004).
14
Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNT’L L. 485, 545 (2005).
15
The Chayes’ managerial model and Thomas Franck’s fairness model similarly focus on states in
their theories of norm compliance. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE
NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995);
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
16
See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 6; Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International
Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998); Thomas Risse & Kathryn
Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices:
Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Thomas Risse et al., eds. 1999).
17
See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996); THE
POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 16; John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang
Together: Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998);
Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,
46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992).
18
FINNEMORE, supra note 17, at 5.
19
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 16.

-6-

achievement of a “taken-for-granted” quality.20 Yet, this theory, like
transnational legal process, focuses on norm diffusion in states, rather than in
localities. It does not explain the process by which international norms interact
with local norms and change communities.
Scholars of international norm diffusion have paid little attention to the
processes through which it occurs on the ground. What is missing is an analysis
of the local—that is, how local communities internalize international norms, and
in particular, how these norms interact with local and state norms and shape local
institutions. In other words, one must study how non-state norms “affect the way
in which an international norm is received . . . on the ground.”21 It is important to
understand how international norms affect local law-making and the relationship
between communities and the states in which they reside. Empirical research,
including ethnographic case studies, can illuminate local processes and fill the
gaps that exist in legal scholarship. It is also useful to consider theories of legal
pluralism, which provide valuable insights for the model of legal mediation that I
present in Section I.B below.
A. Theories of Legal Pluralism
In an age of globalization, people are affiliated with multiple, often
overlapping communities that generate legal norms.22 How does one analyze the
interaction between multiple legal entities? How do local actors negotiate
between conflicting normative commitments, including local, state, and
international norms? A number of so-called “legal pluralism” theories have
attempted to describe this phenomenon based on anthropological and sociolegal
studies. These theories do not only posit the coexistence of more than one legal
system within a social field (e.g., international, state, and local legal systems).23
They also attempt to model the relationships between these legal spheres.24 In
reviewing classic and contemporary accounts of legal pluralism, I will extract
insights that will help us analyze the local internalization of international norms.
Social theorists have developed models of legal pluralism to describe the
existence of concurrent legal orders. Yet until recently, they have mostly failed to
recognize the reciprocal and constantly changing relationship between them.
20

Id.
Berman, supra note 14, at 539.
22
See id. at 507.
23
See, e.g., John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1
(1986).
24
See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 879 (1988).
21
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From the early twentieth century through the 1970s, studies examined colonized
societies, focusing on the relationships of dominance and resistance between state
and local normative orders. According to Leopold Pospisil, legal systems are
superimposed upon one another as hierarchical levels, which can include the state,
community, lineage, and family, among other subgroups.25 A person is
simultaneously a member of multiple subgroups and may be subject to competing
legal obligations. Pospisil’s theory does not allow for the continuous interplay
between different legal systems within a society; nor does it permit the
intermingling of levels that would result from legal systems borrowing concepts
from one another.
Another leading theory of legal pluralism is that of legal scholar and
anthropologist Sally Falk Moore. Moore’s notable contribution to this literature
rejects Pospisil’s notion of legal levels, where multiple legal systems form a
hierarchy with varying degrees of inclusiveness, with the state holding the
monopoly of power. Moore claims that Pospisil focuses on state-made formal
legal rules and does not sufficiently address the rule-making and rule-enforcing
capacities of informal organizations.26 Moore’s own model of legal pluralism is
based not on legal levels but rather on a network of “semi-autonomous social
fields,” defined by their rule-making capacity and their vulnerability to outside
forces.27 She describes all social locales as semi-autonomous because they are
“simultaneously set in a larger social matrix which can, and does, affect and
invade [them], sometimes at the invitation of persons inside [them], sometimes at
[their] own instance.”28
In the past two decades since Moore introduced her theory, legal pluralism
has experienced a resurgence of interest among scholars studying non-colonized
societies, including communities in the United States and Europe, who have
challenged the classic view of legal systems as static and non-interacting.29
Recent scholars recognize “the dialectic, mutually constitutive relation between
state law and other normative orders,” and the dynamics of power between them;
they construct legal identities as fluid, provisional, and contested.30 According to
25

See LEOPOLD POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 125 (1971).
See SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 24, 57 (1978).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 56.
29
See, e.g., David M. Engel, Law, Time, and Community, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 605 (1987);
Carol Greenhouse, Nature is to Culture as Praying is to Suing: Legal Pluralism in an American
Suburb, 20 J. OF LEG. PLURALISM 17 (1982); Sally Engle Merry, Going to Court: Strategies of
Dispute Management in an American Urban Neighborhood, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 891 (1979).
For a review of “classic” and “new” scholarship on legal pluralism, see Merry, supra note 24.
30
Merry, supra note 24, at 880.
26

-8-

Gunther Teubner, legal pluralism is no longer “a set of conflicting social norms
but . . . a multiplicity of diverse communicative processes in a given social field
that observe social action under the binary code of legal/illegal.”31 Teubner
focuses on the symbolic systems inscribed in legal orders. He extends Moore’s
notion of law as process as he describes the legal system as an autopoietic system
of interwoven domains and circular relations continually being modified.32
The dynamic process of multiple networks of intersecting and
interpenetrating legal orders is described by Boaventura de Sousa Santos as
“interlegality.”33 He analyzes the transnationalization of the indigenous peoples’
movement as creating a cosmopolitan legal terrain “composing different layers,
all of them in force together but never in a uniform fashion, all of them in the
same moment but always as a momentary convergence of different temporal
projections.”34 Every legal sphere is historically formed and the product of
interactions with other legal spheres, challenging the classic jurisprudential view
of separate and uniform legal systems.
Continuing this critique of the classic view of legal systems, scholars like
Francis Snyder and Sally Engle Merry have introduced analytic frameworks for
understanding transnational law-making. Snyder studies the international trade in
toys between the European Union and China as a global economic network of
legal sites, including the European Union, the World Trade Organization, and
multinational corporations. According to Snyder, “global legal pluralism” is
being formed in the interaction between EU law, U.S. law, World Trade
Organization law, Chinese law, codes of conduct from multinational corporations
and trade associations, and international customs conventions.35 Drawing on
Teubner’s work, he defines “global legal pluralism” as a network of interwoven
sets of norms.36 Another scholar, Sally Engle Merry, has recently proposed a
“spatial global legal pluralism,” which “incorporates dimensions of power,
meaning, and social relationships into a legal pluralist framework along with an
analysis of spatial relationships.”37 This version of legal pluralism conceptualizes
31

Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW
WITHOUT A STATE 14 (1997).
32
See GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 11 (1993).
33
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of
Law, 14 J. LAW & SOC’Y. 279, 298 (1987).
34
SANTOS, supra note 10, at 457.
35
Francis Snyder, Governing Economic Globalization: Global Legal Pluralism and European
Union Law, 5 EUROPEAN L.J. 334 (1999).
36
Id. at 335.
37
Sally Engle Merry, International Law and Sociolegal Scholarship: Towards a Spatial Legal
Pluralism 4-5 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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the spatial dimensions of laws in order to analyze their transnational movement
and the places where they intersect, overlap, and conflict. It is a theoretically rich
framework for understanding “the way pockets of legal regimes jump to new
regions through transplants, global legal institutions, ratification of human rights
treaties, the creation of special tribunals, and myriad other processes.”38
Building on rich ethnographies, theories of legal pluralism—from early
scholars like Pospisil and Moore to recent ones like Merry, Snyder, Santos, and
Teubner—attempt to understand local settings where multiple legal orders
interact. Instead of focusing only on those norms with enforcement power, legal
pluralists “look to whether members of various shifting and overlapping
communities feel themselves bound by articulated norms.”39 I borrow insights
from these theories in developing a model of legal mediation, described in the
following section. My model focuses on how legal structures are not only
interacting within common locales, but are also shaping and being shaped by one
another.
B. Legal Mediation
Based on my study of the Pimicikamak Cree Nation’s experience, I build
on theories of legal pluralism to further analyze the exchange between multiple
normative communities that occurs on the local level. Local groups like the Cree
are taking an active role in integrating state and international norms into their own
legal institutions while also adapting their local norms and cultural practices.
Legal mediation describes this process of negotiation between multiple legal
spheres. Local actors play an important role in legal mediation by shaping how
international norms get internalized within their communities.
International law is central to the process of legal mediation. Groups
appeal to international law as a means of exerting pressure on states, which may
be discriminating against them.40 In so doing, they are familiarizing themselves
with international norms and asserting their rights, such as indigenous peoples’
right to self-determination. As they assert their political autonomy, local groups
are adopting new laws that borrow from international and state law. Most groups

38

Id. at 24.
Berman, supra note 14, at 539.
40
See generally, KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 6.
39
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are not aspiring for statehood when seeking self-determination, but rather the
survival of their cultural communities.41
The process of legal mediation is an especially apt model for indigenous
communities because of their status as self-governing, culturally cohesive peoples
prior to their subjection to processes of colonization in their own territories.
Indigenous groups are seeking recognition of their customs and laws while also
lobbying for national and international policy reform. Contact with international
institutions and participation in transnational advocacy networks may lead
communities to adapt their local norms accordingly. In this way, the flow of ideas
moves in both directions, with national and international norms being influenced
by local norms. There is thus a “feedback loop,” so that “local actors deploying
or resisting national or international norms may well subvert or transform them,
and the resulting transformation is sure to seep back ‘up’ so that, over time, the
‘international’ norm is transformed as well.”42 In the subsections below, I
describe a number of instances where state and international law and institutions
are recognizing and incorporating customary norms and indigenous law. I then
explain how indigenous peoples participating in the international human rights
community are negotiating the meaning and application of customary laws and
practices as they integrate international and domestic norms.
1. Adaptation of State and International Law
As indigenous communities lobby state and international institutions for
policy reform and begin to adapt their own norms accordingly, there is a feedback
loop and a sharing of concepts among legal orders. The interaction of multiple
normative communities is leading to adaptations in state and international norms
as well. Given the asymmetry of power between local norms and state and
international norms, the sharing of concepts is not completely reciprocal and local
norms are certainly influenced to a greater degree. However, there are some signs
that international and national institutions are beginning to recognize the validity
of local norms, particularly indigenous customs and laws. There are also a
number of examples of institutions incorporating indigenous norms.
Many international bodies, including the United Nations, the World
Intellectual Property Organization, and the World Bank, have given more
attention to indigenous issues and even recognized indigenous customs in their
41

See Maivan Clech Lam, Making Room for Peoples at the United Nations: Thoughts Provoked
by Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603 (1992); Sally Engle
Merry, Anthropology and International Law, 35 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 295 (2006).
42
Berman, supra note 14, at 551.
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policies. Over the last few decades, the United Nations (U.N.) has drafted an
international human rights instrument on the rights of indigenous peoples and
created international fora for them to voice their concerns. The U.N. Working
Group on Indigenous Populations served as the primary arena for indigenous
peoples during the 1980s and 1990s. In 2000, the U.N. created the Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues as an advisory body that reports directly to its
Economic and Social Council. The Permanent Forum, which holds an annual
two-week session in New York City, is jointly composed of state representatives
and indigenous peoples’ representatives (eight government appointees and eight
indigenous peoples). This is the first time that state and non-state representatives
have been accorded parity in a U.N. permanent body.43 Following the creation of
the Permanent Forum, the United Nations appointed the first Special Rapporteur
on the Situation of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous
People.44 The most recent development has been the adoption of the U.N. Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the U.N. Human Rights
Council.45
Other international organizations have similarly supported the protection
of indigenous rights. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), an
agency of the United Nations, has sponsored activities in support of the traditional
knowledge of native peoples. After assembling its first annual Roundtable on
Indigenous Intellectual Property in 1998, WIPO undertook fact-finding missions
to native communities worldwide to study current approaches to the protection of
intellectual property rights of holders of indigenous knowledge, innovations, and
culture. In 2000, it established an Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
Property, Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Expression of Folklore.
One of the aims of this body is to encourage the development of national
intellectual property legislation to protect indigenous knowledge and folklore. In
this way, international institutions like WIPO are promoting the recognition of
indigenous norms and customs by state legal systems.
Finally, development aid agencies like the World Bank have integrated
indigenous norms into their investment projects. In 1991, the Bank issued
operational directive (OD) 4.20, which was designed to “avoid or mitigate
potentially adverse effects on indigenous people caused by Bank-assisted

43

Carey & Wiessner, supra note 2.
In 2001, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights appointed Rudolfo Stavenhagen from Mexico
as the first Special Rapporteur. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Res/2001/57, available at
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/sdpage_e.aspx?m=73&t=11.
45
See supra note 3.
44
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activities.”46 OD 4.20’s strategy statement promotes the adoption of customary
law and the informed participation of native peoples in projects. It supports the
“incorporation of indigenous knowledge into project approaches” and the
integration of “local patterns of social organization, religious beliefs, and resource
use” in the Bank’s Indigenous Peoples Development Plans.47 In 2005, the Bank
approved a revised operational policy and bank procedure on indigenous peoples
(OP/BP 4.10), which includes similar provisions. Other development banks have
approved comparable guidelines to address indigenous issues and protect
customary norms when designing development projects.48 The development
banks’ operational policies demonstrate the power of local communities to
influence international law, which then shapes the laws of borrower countries.49
In addition to international organizations, there are state courts and
legislative bodies that have not only recognized but have also incorporated
indigenous norms into domestic policy. One of the most notable developments is
the Canadian Supreme Court’s acceptance of oral history as an admissible form of
legal evidence to prove aboriginal land title. In the 1997 case of Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia, the Court expanded the rules of aboriginal title to land to
include evidence of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en peoples’ spiritual connection
and attachment to their territory, including oral history.50 It held:
A court should approach the rules of evidence, and interpret the evidence
that exists, with a consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal claims,
and of the evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in
times where there were no written records of the practices, customs, and
traditions engaged in. The courts must not undervalue the evidence
46

World Bank, The World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Directive 4.20 (Sept. 1991)
(Indigenous Peoples).
47
Id. at paras. 8, 14.
48
See Inter-American Development Bank, Strategy for Indigenous Development (2006), available
at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=691275; Asian Development Bank,
Policy
on
Indigenous
Peoples
(1998),
available
at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Indigenous_Peoples/ADB-1998-Policy-on-IP.pdf.
49
See generally, Galit A. Sarfaty, Note, The World Bank and the Internalization of Indigenous
Rights Norms, 114 YALE L.J. 1791 (2005).
50
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. This case was brought in the early
1980s by the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en peoples, who sought to pressure the government of
British Columbia to acknowledge aboriginal title and enter into land claims negotiations. The
most significant evidence of a spiritual connection between the two groups and their territory was
a feast hall where the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en peoples orally pass down stories and songs that
tie them to their land. The Supreme Court ruled against the trial judge’s refusal to recognize the
indigenous peoples’ oral history as permissible evidence and ordered that a new trial be convened
that gave weight to their oral histories as evidence.
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presented by aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence does not
conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be applied in,
for example, a private law torts case. . . . Notwithstanding the challenges
created by the use of oral histories as proof of historical facts, the laws of
evidence must be adapted in order that this type of evidence can be
accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the types of historical
evidence that courts are familiar with.51
This decision recognizes that the traditional laws of evidence in Canadian courts
unfairly discriminated against indigenous peoples and, therefore, should be
expanded in future trials to include oral testimony.
In Norway, the native Sami people, who have presided over the Sami
Council since 1956, have influenced court procedures and federal law through
their political participation. As a result of the Sami’s effective lobbying,
Norwegian courts are now obliged to use the Sami language in prosecution and
when taking evidence.52 Moreover, Sami may be used as a language of
administration in the six municipalities with the largest concentration of Sami
people.53
Besides revising court procedures to accommodate indigenous norms,
many countries are also passing legislation that explicitly recognizes and gives
rights to native peoples and incorporates their customary law. Under pressure
from civil society movements, several Latin American countries, such as
Colombia and Mexico, have recently voted to officially recognize indigenous
peoples within their constitutions.54 The new constitution in Bolivia, adopted in
1994, treats indigenous communities as legal entities and gives them the power to
exercise administrative functions and alternative dispute resolution procedures in
accordance with their customs.55 Traditional indigenous councils in Colombia are
51

Id. at paras. 80, 87.
MANUELA TOMEI & LEE SWEPSTON, INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES: A GUIDE TO ILO
CONVENTION NO. 169 (1996), Box No. 8
53
Id.
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Colombia’s new constitution, adopted in 1991, recognizes and protects the ethnic and cultural
diversity of the Colombian nation. See Constitución Política de la República de Colombia, as
amended, Título I, Artículo 7, 27 de Julio de 2005 (Colom.). A 1991 amendment to the Mexican
constitution states that Mexico has a multicultural composition based originally on its indigenous
peoples. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended, Título
Primero, Capítulo 1, Artículo 2, Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 27 de Septiembre de 2004
(Mex.).
55
See Constitución Política de la República de Bolívia, as amended, Título Tercero, Artículo 171,
6 de Julio de 2005 (Bol.).
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given similar power under the country’s constitution. They have full judicial
authority in accordance with their customary laws, as long as their practices are
not contrary to national legislation.56
European countries have also recognized indigenous rights and, in one
case, borrowed from the local norms of indigenous peoples when drafting national
laws. As an expression of united European support for indigenous concerns, the
European Parliament in 1994 adopted a resolution on “Measures Required
Internationally to Provide Effective Protection for Indigenous Peoples.”57 The
resolution affirms the right of native peoples “to determine their own destiny by
choosing their institutions, their political status, and that of their territory.”58
Some European countries have also issued policies on indigenous rights to guide
aid to developing countries.59 For instance, Switzerland’s policy requires
consultation with indigenous organizations in the planning, implementation, and
evaluation of projects and the design of corrective measures against potential
harmful impacts.60 The policy commits Switzerland to engage in political
dialogue with partner countries towards strengthening indigenous peoples’
political participation and protecting their rights within local legal systems.61
Denmark has gone so far as to draw upon the customary law of the Greenlandic
Inuit when writing its Greenland Criminal Code. The law measures sanctions not
by the gravity of the crime but by the individual offender’s personal
background.62 It is based on Inuit legal tradition, which aims to eliminate conflict
and restore peace rather than to seek punishment or justice.63 The adoption of
these policies suggests the growing influence of the indigenous rights movement
56

See Constitución Política de la República de Colombia, as amended, Capítulo V, Artículo 246,
27 de Julio de 2005 (Colom.).
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Resolution on Action Required Internationally to Provide Effective Protection for Indigenous
Peoples, EUR. PARL. DOC. (PV 58) 2 (1994).
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Id. at 3, para. 2.
59
See SWISS AGENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION, SWISS ACTION FOR INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES 32 (1998) (referencing Netherlands’s Policy on Indigenous Peoples, 1993; the Danish
Strategy for Support to Indigenous Peoples, 1994; Guidance on Ethnicity, Ethnic Minorities and
Indigenous Peoples, United Kingdom, 1995; Policy for Indigenous Peoples in Latin America,
Germany, 1996; and Strategy for Cooperation with Indigenous Peoples, Spain, 1997).
60
Id. at 18.
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Id. at 21. In accordance with this policy, Switzerland supported the creation of human rights
defense centers in Bolivia, which pay special attention to the rights of indigenous peoples in the
administration of justice. Id.
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See VERNER GOLDSCHMIDT, Introduction to THE GREENLAND CRIMINAL CODE 3 (Leonard
Kaplan, Michael Merrit & Norval Morris eds., Fred B. Rothman & Co.) (1970).
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Elaine Schechter, The Greenland Criminal Code and the Limits to Legal Pluralism, 7
ÉTUDES/INUIT/STUDIES 79, 79 (1983) (quoted in ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER
SOCIAL JUSTICE COMMISSIONER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, THIRD
REPORT 23 (1995)).
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in lobbying for recognition and even incorporation of customary norms and
cultural practices.
2. Indigenous Peoples and their Negotiation of Local Law
In the process of lobbying for changes in domestic and international
policy, indigenous communities are adopting normative commitments from other
legal orders (i.e., state and international law) and reevaluating their own
conceptions of law and justice. Political mobilization by indigenous groups
contains at least three interrelated components: (i) an appeal to international
human rights norms to justify the protection of their rights; (ii) an attempt to
interpret state law and enforce treaty obligations in a light favorable to the
maintenance of their autonomy; and (iii) an effort to assert the legitimacy of local
indigenous law and cultural norms in both domestic and international legal
systems. While advocating for the recognition of their customary practices, they
are negotiating the meaning and application of their local laws. As they frame
and re-frame their claims for national and international audiences, groups find
themselves looking within and engaging in an intra-group dialogue over the
meaning of their cultural norms.
As a collectivity, rather than simply a group of individuals, an indigenous
group acts as an insular interpretive community, or in the terminology of Robert
Cover, a nomos—a normative universe held together by interpretive
commitments.64 Such communities “establish their own meanings for
constitutional principles through their constant struggle to define and maintain the
independence and authority of their nomos.”65 Indigenous peoples are engaged in
constant campaigns for their political, cultural, and economic sovereignty. They
are fighting for decision-making authority over such issues as the structure of
their government, their language of administration, and their strategy for
economic development.
The “jurisgenerative” process, whereby legal meaning is created within a
community, is dialectical between those inside and outside the community and
among community members themselves.66 Cover notes that freedom of
association within an interpretive community “implies a degree of normgenerating autonomy,” which he defines as “a liberty and capacity to create and

64

Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1983).
65
Id. at 25.
66
Id. at 15.
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interpret law—minimally, to interpret the terms of the association’s own being.”67
As indigenous groups translate the language of rights into their own local legal
conceptions, non-indigenous (state and international) norms become what
Clifford Geertz describes as “local knowledge” and customary norms are
reinterpreted accordingly.68 This has been the experience of the Pimicikamak
Cree Nation when redesigning its local government and laws pursuant to its right
to self-determination. Building on their recent political mobilization in the
international human rights community, the Cree are engaging in legal mediation
among local, state, and international norms.
II. THE PIMICIKAMAK CREE NATION
Before engaging in legal mediation, local communities like indigenous
peoples have often been exposed to international norms through their global
campaigns for human rights. This Part offers an ethnographic narrative of the
diffusion of international norms in one indigenous community, the Pimicikamak
Cree Nation of Cross Lake, Manitoba. Since suffering from the destructive
effects of a state-funded hydroelectric dam constructed in the 1970s, the Cree
have demanded compensation from the Canadian government, as promised under
the Northern Flood Agreement (NFA).69 Over the past two decades, the socioeconomic situation of the Cree has been dismal—by 1998, they were suffering
from about 85% unemployment,70 high alcoholism, one of the highest crime rates
in Manitoba, and a suicide rate ten times the general rate for native people in
Canada and 23 times the national average.71 Although the Cree were enduring
poverty conditions and mental health problems, they nevertheless remained
hopeful that change was possible.
Rather than waiting indeterminately for external assistance, the Cree
decided in 1998 to pursue an international campaign against the Canadian
government as a means of rebuilding their community. Their activism was
motivated by “an absence of validation, a lack of willingness on the part of
governments to seriously acknowledge social suffering and a collective
67

Id. at 32.
Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL
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experience of injustice.”72 In cooperation with other indigenous and
environmental organizations, the Cree invoked international human rights
discourse as they asserted their right to self-determination. In this case study, I
describe the historical circumstances that form the background of the Cree’s
human rights campaign. I then describe the Cree’s appeals to international law
and their participation in the transnational advocacy network for indigenous
rights. Finally, I discuss the international right to self-determination that serves as
the basis for their assertion of political autonomy. In Part III, I will analyze their
unique model of self-government that reconciles local, state, and international
law.
A. Historical Background
The Pimicikamak Cree’s reservation is located 520 air kilometers north of
Winnipeg along the shore of the Nelson River, where it enters Cross Lake. The
total registered population is 6,625 (including 4,701 on-reserve),73 with more than
50 percent of the population under the age of 20.74 Language is the basis of Cree
culture and is spoken by the majority of residents in everyday conversation. Not
only is Cree instruction incorporated into the on-reserve schools, but public
meetings, political debates, local entertainment, and radio broadcasts are also
conducted in Cree.75
Until the 1970s, Cree residents subsisted off the land in relative isolation
from the rest of Manitoba. Leading a self-sufficient, nomadic way of life, they
developed a social structure that was highly influenced by their natural resourcebased economy. Their basic governing process was based on consultation and
consensus, which was the customary decision-making method among Cree
hunters working in trapline areas.76 The Cree’s relative isolation gradually began
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66-67 (2003).
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Jason Miller, Statement to the Interchurch Inquiry on Northern Hydro Development (June 22,
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See RONALD NIEZEN, DEFENDING THE LAND 16-17, 62 (1998).
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to decline, as increasing accessibility to the outside through winter roads led to
greater contact with non-Cree society.
In the 1970s, an unexpected event suddenly altered the Cree’s lifestyle
and transformed their community: the construction of the Churchill-Nelson River
hydroelectric dam project. The three parties responsible for the dam were the
Canadian government, the Manitoba government, and Manitoba Hydro, an
electric utility corporation headquartered in Winnipeg. Construction on the
project commenced without the completion of environmental studies and, most
notably, without prior consultation with or approval from the five affected native
communities.77 The Canadian government later acknowledged these failures in
the 1992 Report of the Auditor General of Canada and the 1996 Final Report of
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.78 Due to the lack of an
environmental impact review, the project unexpectedly flooded 20 percent of the
five communities’ reserve land-base, causing permanent disruptions to the
ecosystem and their livelihoods.79
The flooding of Cross Lake in 1974 and the completion of the dam a year
later caused massive ecological destruction that severely altered the subsistence
economy and culture of the Pimicikamak Cree Nation.80 The erosion of the
77

The five affected native communities were the Cree Nations of Cross Lake, Split Lake, Norway
House, York Landing, and Nelson House.
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The 1992 Report states, “We found no evidence that a comprehensive environmental impact
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shorelines, unnatural fluctuations in water levels, and reversal of seasonal water
flows rendered numerous traditional Cree hunting routes fatally treacherous. The
sedimentation in the water caused the release of methyl-mercury and the
contamination of fish, an integral part of the Cree subsistence diet.81 As a result
of elevated mercury levels, as well as the destruction of spawning grounds and
changes in water flows, commercial fishing was no longer a viable industry.82
Without the option of continuing to live off the land, the majority of Cree became
welfare recipients and had to learn new skills to compete in the growing wage
economy.83 By undermining the traditional hunting, trapping, and fishing way of
life, the hydroelectric project attacked Cree cultural values as well as the physical
and psychological health of the community.
1. The Northern Flood Agreement (NFA) in the Context of
Canadian-Indigenous Policies
In the wake of the Churchill-Nelson River hydroelectric project, five Cree
First Nations, including the Pimicikamak Cree Nation of Cross Lake, formed the
Northern Flood Committee in 1974 and negotiated the Northern Flood Agreement
(NFA) with Manitoba Hydro and the governments of Canada and Manitoba (the
three “Crown parties”).84 The comprehensive NFA, a legally binding document,
was signed on December 16, 1977.85 It promises four acres of replacement land
for each acre flooded, protection of wildlife resources and harvesting activities,
compensation for injury or loss of life on hazardous waterways, funding for social
and economic development, and remedial measures to secure eroding shorelines,
remove debris, and restore burial sites.86 It also guarantees the protection of all
rights described in Treaty Number Five of 1875.87 Finally, the NFA promises to
support the ongoing viability of the communities “for the lifetime of the project”
(Art. 25) and to ensure “the eradication of mass unemployment and mass poverty”
81
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(Schedule “E”). The NFA does not represent a one-time legal settlement, but a
long-term socio-economic relationship of trust between the indigenous
communities and the Crown parties. In order to understand where the NFA fits
within the larger context of Canada’s treatment of its native people, it is important
to review the Canadian policies leading up to and following its adoption.
The NFA is part of a history of Canadian-indigenous relations that began
with the Indian Act of 1876. Administered by the federal Department of Indian
Affairs, the Indian Act gives the Canadian government far-reaching control over
the affairs of native people––e.g., tribal government structure, reservation lands
and resources, Indian status, taxation, health, and education. It represents a
fiduciary obligation on the Canadian government to protect Indian lands from
unauthorized use or takings. Under the Indian Act, a Chief and Council replaced
traditional tribal governments as agents of the Canadian government. In its
provisions for the Chief and Council tribal government system, the act establishes
regulations for elections and political administration, giving tribes limited power
under federal supervision. Its basic agenda of assimilation and its attitude of
paternalism have been partially mitigated with revisions in 1951 that reversed the
ban on the potlatch and sun dance traditional ceremonies and ended the
prohibition against native people’s entry into public bars. A 1995 amendment to
the Indian Act removed a gender discriminatory regulation that did not recognize
native women who married non-native men as “status Indians” deserving of
federal benefits.88
In 1982, the government drafted the Canadian Constitution, which
recognizes and affirms existing aboriginal and treaty rights.89 It invited
indigenous leaders to preparatory talks regarding the Constitution and consulted
with them on other policy reports, including the Report of the Special Committee
on Indian Self-Government (the Penner Report) of 1983. The Penner Report calls
“for a renewed federal-Indian relationship . . . [which] recognize[s] that Indian
First Nations constitute a distinct order of government in Canada.”90 It outlines a
process of devolving more management responsibility to native communities and
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full legislative power to Indian governments in such areas as social and economic
development, land and resource use, and law enforcement.
Over the last two decades, Canadian policy statements have supported the
right of indigenous peoples to political autonomy. In August 1995, the
government approved a policy for negotiating self-government agreements
individually adapted for different communities.91 Its recognition that no single
form of government works for all communities is a marked departure from the
Indian Act approach. A number of communities, including the Pimicikamak Cree
Nation, have taken advantage of this new policy to design a government that
draws upon customary law. I will outline the details of this government in Part
III.
2. Failure to Implement the NFA
In the decades since the the NFA’s ratification, the Crown parties have
failed to implement its core provisions.92 According to the Report of the
Interchurch Inquiry into Northern Hydro Development, “much of the history of
NFA implementation is characterized largely by avoidance of responsibility on
the part of the Crown parties.”93 A research report prepared for the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples concludes:
The three parties did not intend, and have never intended to cooperate
energetically in measures designed and determined to be effective in
confronting the adverse impacts of the project. They have instead used
every legal device to limit their individual liabilities under the Agreement.
The sixteen year history of the NFA is largely a record of the deployment
of those devices . . . . To the communities [the history of the NFA] is a
manifestation of bad faith by both levels of government. It has done little
to address the impacts which continue to confront the communities.94
By 1999, the Cree had received negligible compensation in the 23 years since
signing the NFA.95 For example, the federal government had granted only 60 of
91
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the 14,000 hectares of promised replacement lands and Manitoba Hydro had not
created the jobs that it had promised under the NFA.96
Beginning in 1992, the Crown parties offered to replace the NFA with
one-time cash buy-out settlements, called Comprehensive Implementation
Agreements (CIAs), with the five affected native communities.97 Rather than
implement the provisions of the earlier agreement, the CIAs would have
terminated many of the Crown parties’ NFA treaty and fiduciary obligations and
prevented signatory tribes from pursuing any future lawsuits by limiting the
parties’ ongoing liabilities under the NFA (with the exception of injuries, deaths,
and unforeseen impacts).98 Given that the Canadian government did not conduct
a comprehensive damage assessment, there was no assurance that the lump sum
payments would fairly compensate for long-term NFA implementation costs. The
communities were forced into a seemingly lose-lose situation––sign the CIA and
accept the extinguishment of treaty rights or continue to live in severe poverty,
unsure of whether the NFA would ever be implemented.
Amid heated intra-tribal disputes, all the signatory indigenous nations
accepted the CIAs except the Pimicikamak Cree of Cross Lake.99 As the largest
and poorest of the five affected Cree communities, the Pimicikamak Cree Nation
great majority of the Northern Flood Agreement was never implemented. After 21 years, virtually
nothing had been done.” Allmand also suspected that at some point, governments “came to the
conclusion that they didn’t like the Northern Flood Agreement, that maybe it had too many
obligations, it was too rich and they decided they would try to get something better in its place––
[the Comprehensive Implementation Agreements].” Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development, House of Commons (Mar. 9, 1999) (statement of Warren Allmand,
former federal Minister of Indian Affairs), available at
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refused to abandon claims to the NFA obligations that it had awaited for over
twenty years. Many community members viewed the CIA as a “sell-out” with no
mechanism for reaching the lasting self-sufficiency promised under the NFA.100
The Pimicikamak Cree’s decision was influenced by the factionalization of
communities like the Norway House Cree Nation, which ultimately ratified the
CIA in 1997. A prominent minority of dissidents in Norway House questioned
the legitimacy of the federally-administered process, which was based on a local
referendum where the Canadian government promised to pay about $1,000 to
each community member who voted for the settlement deal.101 A few years after
Norway House signed the CIA, former Chief Allan Ross attributed “personal
greed” as the reason why residents voted for the agreement.102 He admitted that
he didn’t see much benefit in signing the agreement for Norway House because
many of their rights under the NFA have been now extinguished and they no
longer have the option of appealing to the Canadian government.103
Since their decision to reject the CIA in late 1997, the Pimicikamak Cree
intensified their campaign for NFA implementation and extended it
internationally. They promised to “take all legitimate actions, consistent with
[their] commitment to non-violence and [their] treaties of peace with Canada, to
defend [their] human rights.”104 The devastating social, environmental, and
economic damages deriving from the hydroelectric project and the nonimplementation of the NFA inspired a wave of political and cultural awareness
within the community. Political mobilization prompted many residents to
advocate for a return to their customary practices. According to Chief John
Miswagon, the Cree decided to base their new government on traditions, which
“are integral to our identity as a people and our relationship to the land.”105 Their
recent self-government initiative and the preservation of their cultural norms
100
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indicate that they have not given up their fight for social justice. Twenty-three
years after the signing of the NFA, the Cree have united under a new rallying cry:
“Enough is enough!”106
B. Transnational Political Mobilization
Our voice will be heard in homes, in schools, in churches, in courts, in the
legislature, in Parliament, in export markets, in bond-rating agencies, in
international financial circles, in human rights forums, in places you have
not yet dreamed of. . . . [O]ur voice will not be silenced. It is high time
that public and international attention should focus on the behavior of
federal and provincial governments towards us over the last three decades.
And yes, we hope that those whose causes include human rights,
aboriginal rights, the environment, ethical investment, religion, and
international law will join us.
-- Former Pimicikamak Cree Chief Roland
Robinson107
Following their rejection of the CIA in October 1997, the Cree felt that it was
time to take action against the Canadian government’s failure to implement the
NFA. During this period, there was “a confused reawakening in which anger and
sorrow over years of unatoned grievance mingled uncomfortably with a sense of
empowerment.”108 For the first time, the Cree invoked their “inherent
jurisdiction” (as opposed to the jurisdiction provided in the Indian Act) to elect a
new Chief, who reinvigorated their battle for NFA implementation and their right
to self-government.109 Inherent jurisdiction refers to the power of a people to
govern itself as it formerly did, based upon its traditions, customs, and inherent
rights as a nation. This form of government stands in contrast to a system of laws
deriving from treaties or a delegation of authority by the Canadian government.
Feeling betrayed by the Crown parties’ attempts to buy out their NFA
promises, the Cree organized a political campaign focused on appeals to
international human rights law, particularly their right to self-determination. They
106
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adopted a strategy of public visibility by collaborating with national and
international human rights organizations and using the media to broadcast their
grievances. They called this tactic: a “politics of embarrassment.”110 In a
working paper entitled A New Relationship,111 the Cree proclaim that “for [their]
purposes, the court of public opinion tends to work faster, cheaper, and better.
Expressed in Cree terms, [the Pimicikamak Cree’s] strategy is to rely upon the
Law of Consequences, . . . [in which] visibility is seen as a more effective
approach to accountability than alternatives such as arbitration or court
actions.”112
While asserting the right to self-determination of peoples under
international law, the Cree have campaigned internationally to protest injustices
by the Canadian government and the state-sponsored Manitoba Hydro
corporation.113 They have spoken to church groups and colleges throughout
Winnipeg to inform Manitoba Hydro customers of the social costs of their electric
power.114 Their public relations drive has extended to the Midwestern United
States, including Minnesota, whose residents purchase 90 percent of Manitoba
Hydro’s energy exports.115 Finally, it has even reached Geneva, Switzerland,
where the Cree have lobbied the U.N. for the protection of their rights under the
International Human Rights Covenants.116 Through their involvement at the
U.N., the Cree have publicized Canada’s violations of their rights, as
demonstrated by its failure to implement the NFA, its underfunding of the tribe
110
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over the last decade, and its depriving of the Cree’s own means of subsistence.
Their transnational campaign reflects the political mobilization of indigenous
groups worldwide as they pressure states to comply with international norms.
1. Appeals to the United Nations
While traveling across Manitoba and the United States to gather support
for their campaign, the Cree decided to further broaden their audience by
appealing to the U.N. They first became involved with the U.N. through their
affiliation with the Grand Council of the Crees, a political body that represents
about 14,000 Cree in Northern Quebec.117 The Grand Council, which has had
consultative status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council since the 1980s,
has educated the Pimicikamak Cree on the international human rights system and
included information about their situation as part of its submissions to U.N.
bodies. For example, the Grand Council’s November 1998 report to the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which monitors countries’
compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, described the unfulfilled NFA promises, low per capita government
expenditures, and high suicide rate at the Pimicikamak Cree Nation.118 During
the December 1998 meeting of the U.N. Committee, then Pimicikamak Cree
Chief Roland Robinson joined Grand Council representatives, the Chief of the
Assembly of First Nations, and four other Manitoba Chiefs to address the thirdworld social conditions existing on Canadian reservations.
The observations published at the conclusion of the U.N. meeting
reproached Canada for its treatment of its indigenous people. The Committee
concluded that “policies which violate aboriginal treaty obligations and
extinguishment, conversion, or giving up of aboriginal rights” are a human rights
concern emerging out of the International Bill of Human Rights.119 Thus,
117
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Canada’s failure to honor the Northern Flood Agreement would be considered a
breach of its U.N. treaty obligations. The Committee’s comments on Canada’s
violation of indigenous rights received worldwide attention as “one of the most
scathing critiques of an affluent country that’s ever been released by a U.N.
human rights body.”120
Only four months after the release of the Committee on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights’ observations, another U.N. committee, the Human Rights
Committee on Civil and Political Rights, declared that “the situation of the
aboriginal peoples remains the most pressing human rights issue facing
Canadians.”121 As the U.N. body responsible for monitoring the implementation
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights
Committee emphasized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination and
urged Canada to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples’ 1996 study. The Committee’s April 1999 report was largely
in response to a submission by the Grand Council of the Crees that included
testimony from the Pimicikamak Cree Nation.
The health care crisis at the Pimicikamak Cree Nation, including the high
suicide rate and the shortage of nurses, was the subject of further international
lobbying at the U.N. by the Cree.122 After repeatedly issuing complaints to the
provincial and federal governments, the Cree contacted Dr. Arthur Kleinman,
then chairman of Harvard University’s School of Social Medicine, for an expert
opinion on the inadequate health care services in the community. Citing Dr.
Kleinman’s assessment of the “crisis level” situation at their reservation, the Cree
wrote letters to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the U.N. Committee
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. A Cree representative also testified at
a WHO conference during the fall of 1999.123 He informed the panel that the
Pimicikamak Cree Nation had been forced into a state of emergency that violates
120
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Articles 1, 2, and 12 of the U.N. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights.124 The Cree publicized the testimony to the WHO and comments
by the U.N. Committees to bring international pressure on the Canadian
government.
2. Participation in Transnational Advocacy Networks
The Cree’s U.N. submissions and participation at international meetings
reveal the growing importance of the international arena in their battle for NFA
implementation and the protection of their human rights. By uniting with other
Cree nations across Canada, the Pimicikamak Cree were able to magnify their
voice in U.N. fora and challenge Canada’s human rights record. They have
collaborated with indigenous groups from across the globe as they communicated
their grievances at the annual meetings of the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous
Populations. They have also garnered support from environmental organizations,
particularly in the United States where they have publicized the environmental
degradation “at the other end of [residents’] power supply.”125 In so doing, the
Cree have joined transnational advocacy networks on the environment and on
indigenous rights.126 Groups like the Cree who participate in advocacy networks
“create categories or frames within which to generate and organize information on
which to base their campaigns.”127 As they attempt to open up channels of
communication with states, they follow a “boomerang pattern of influence, . . .
[where] domestic NGOs bypass their states and directly search out international
allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside.”128
Indigenous peoples like the Cree are employing international human rights
discourse to win recognition as collectivities deserving of protection. As
anthropologist Sally Engle Merry has observed:
As various societies mobilize Western law in their demands for human
rights, they reinterpret and transform Western law in accordance with their
own local legal conceptions and with the resources provided by the global
human rights system. They talk rights, reparations, and claims––the
124
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language of law––but construct a new law out of the fragments of the
old.129
This form of popular mobilization has become an important mechanism for
achieving consciousness-raising both inside and outside the international
indigenous movement. The prevalence of international human rights legal
discourse within campaigns represents “the capacity of constitutionalism and
contract, rights and legal remedies, to accomplish order, civility, justice, [and]
empowerment.”130 Indigenous peoples have become “word warriors” who use the
language of human rights law, including its discourse of rights, reparations, and
claims, to develop an intercultural dialogue.131 Through this process, they
translate collective claims for redress for past injustices into narratives of human
rights and nation-building.
In invoking international human rights language and publicizing violations
by the Canadian government and Manitoba Hydro, the Cree have allied
themselves with not only indigenous organizations but also environmental interest
groups in the United States. The Cree’s lobbying activities in the United States
have aimed at making Manitoba Hydro’s American customers aware of the
negative environmental and social effects produced by the dam that provides their
electricity. The rationale of this approach was that if enough people in Minnesota
became concerned about the situation, they might successfully lobby the Northern
States Power Company to stop purchasing hydroelectric power from Manitoba
Hydro. Such a result would have severely reduced Manitoba Hydro’s profits and
damaged its reputation, consequently hindering future purchases of its power by
other American companies.
The Cree spread their message and recruited support from national and
international environmental justice organizations through a public relations tour
beginning in late 1998. They allied with organizations such as the Sierra Club
and the Audubon Society.132 They were also able to join forces with local
environmental groups like Minnesotans for an Energy Efficient Economy, which
was resisting the establishment of a proposed transmission line by Manitoba
Hydro in the Midwest-Northeast corridor that would threaten farmlands and
129
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wildlife habitat.133 They borrowed many of their public relations and lobbying
tactics from other indigenous groups like the James Bay Cree, who had mounted a
successful campaign against a proposed Hydro Quebec project in the early 1990s
by allying with environmental organizations in the Northeast United States.134 As
a result, the Cree expanded their network of supporters across the border and
identified their cause with a broader range of values, such as environmental
justice, that would appeal to the non-indigenous public.
C. Asserting a Right to Self-Determination
The international human rights norm that is most frequently invoked and
most internalized among indigenous peoples is the right to self-determination,
which forms the basis for the Cree’s campaign for political autonomy. One
cannot discuss indigenous rights today without encountering the concept of selfdetermination. Defined as a fundamental right of all “peoples” under the 1945
U.N. Charter, self-determination is understood by indigenous groups as the right
to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development.”135 Despite the right’s historical association with
secession, most indigenous peoples favor its realization through the attainment of
limited sovereignty within states.136
Self-determination refers to the power of peoples to govern themselves
and to exercise autonomy over their affairs. As an abstract principle, it has
political, cultural, social, and economic aspects. Economic self-determination, for
instance, describes a people’s control over the development of its land and natural
resources. References to self-determination in this Article focus on the concept’s
political aspect—i.e., an indigenous group’s realization of political autonomy
through self-government.

133

Id.
See id. at 149.
135
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot.
of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, art. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (Aug. 26, 1994). The U.N.
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is a statement of international human rights
standards concerning indigenous peoples. Formulated by the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous
Populations, the Draft Declaration is the product of over eight years of extensive deliberations by
indigenous peoples and U.N. experts.
136
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 80-88. There are some indigenous peoples that do favor secession
as an application of their right to self-determination. For example, the Mohawk Nation asserts its
right to statehood and refuses to acknowledge Canada’s sovereignty over its territory.
134

- 31 -

Self-determination is commonly understood as a sort of relational
autonomy existing under a principle of non-domination, rather than as sovereign
independence entailing non-intervention and non-interference.137 In a global
world where state sovereignty is transforming, “the concept of self-determination
is capable of embracing much more nuanced interpretations and applications [than
just independent statehood].”138 S. James Anaya differentiates between two
normative strains within the right of self-determination––its constitutive aspect
and its ongoing aspect. The first aspect refers to the requirement “that the
governing institutional order be substantially the creation of processes guided by
the will of the people, or peoples, governed.”139 The second refers to the
requirement “that the governing institutional order, independently of the processes
leading to its creation or alteration, be one under which people may live and
develop freely on a continuous basis.”140 The Pimicikamak Cree’s reinvention of
their government on their own terms, rather than on the terms of Canada’s Indian
Act, expresses the constitutive aspect of self-determination. By designing a
government that negotiates between local, national, and international law, they are
striving to achieve the ongoing aspect of self-determination.
Self-determination is widely recognized as a customary international legal
principle and even as jus cogen, a peremptory norm of universal application.141
However, there exists no universal model of self-determination that defines
particular institutional forms or political-juridical frameworks for all contexts.
Understandings of self-determination differ across groups and shift over time, all
the while necessitating ongoing negotiations. The specific features of a regime of
self-determination should be evaluated “in terms of the historical conditions it
stems from and for which it tries to provide responses.”142
Thus, self-determination can be understood as a negotiated governance
agreement between states and peoples. It has a contextualized meaning, in the
sense that self-determination models vary according to each group’s
137
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circumstances. Indigenous peoples would each determine appropriately defined
models for their relational autonomy within states. Under the principle of selfdetermination, the Pimicikamak Cree are developing a unique self-governance
model—one that adapts customary norms with Canadian and international law.
The Cree have developed an innovative strategy of legal mediation as they assert
their right to self-determination.
III. LEGAL MEDIATION BETWEEN CREE, CANADIAN, AND INTERNATIONAL
NORMS
In the process of appealing to international human rights law to support
their campaign for self-determination, the Pimicikamak Cree exercised their
inherent lawmaking authority and developed a new government—one based on
legal mediation between their local law and Canadian and international law.
According to the Assembly of First Nations, the Pimicikamak Cree Nation is “a
model of accountable governance based on inherent jurisdiction that seeks to
reconcile tradition with modern circumstances.”143 The case of the Cree
represents one way in which indigenous nations and other communities can
design their governments as they assert their political autonomy from states.
In this Part, I elaborate on the unique model of self-government that the
Cree have developed in pursuit of their right to self-determination. I first describe
how the Cree have preserved particular cultural norms and customary legal
procedures as the basis for their new government. In the second section, I analyze
how they have adapted their governing structure and laws to accommodate their
new relationship with Canada. I then provide evidence of how they have
internalized international human rights norms into both their government and
local political discourse. Finally, I consider possible limits of the legal mediation
model for the Cree and other local communities.
A. Preservation of Cultural Norms
PCN [The Pimicikamak Cree Nation] is rediscovering itself, after
enduring more than a century of governmental repression, disaggregation
and assimilation. Despite all, PCN survives. Its cultural roots are deep.
PCN’s traditional government, by which it has governed its own affairs
since time immemorial, has re-awakaned [sic] and has modernized its
structure and methods.144
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As the Cree designed a government that borrowed from national and international
norms, it was important for them to concurrently preserve their cultural norms.
They sought to liberate themselves from the tribal government that Canada had
imposed on them under the Indian Act and that had, in their view, led to social
breakdown within their community. Associating the Indian Act legal model with
a history of betrayal by Canada, they aimed to integrate traditional legal practices
into their government and thereby encourage local political participation. The
Cree have restructured many of their political institutions in an effort to maintain
their cultural integrity.
The revival and adaptation of Cree governing institutions originated in a
general cultural resurgence within the community over the past decade. Raymond
Robinson, the Cree’s former director of economic development, described this
time as “a new beginning, with respect to . . . being proud to be a Cree and to
defend[ing] the Cree holistically inside and out, community-wise, politically, and
against anyone who dared squash it.”145 The Cree elders played an important role
in this movement for cultural renewal, as a resident affirmed: “Through the
elders’ teachings, [the Cree] found that [they] have to go back to [their traditional
Cree value system] to make it work.”146
The Cree have incorporated their traditional dispute resolution approach to
justice in their new government. Many Cree felt impaired by “the external nature
and formality of the provincial court system [that] creates barriers to an effective
resolution of disputes for families.”147 While sanctions are used for punishment
in Western judicial systems, the primary objective of the Cree judicial system is to
reestablish peaceful coexistence between community members and to restore
harmony. Instead of relying on an individual-based, adversarial approach to
achieving justice, the Cree view justice as a perpetual process of maintaining
balance. According to this perspective, justice is attained when min-oo-puh-niw
(harmony), mi-nah-sin (beauty), and mi-nah-yaw-win (well-being) are achieved at
the levels of individual, family, and community.148 Mi-nah-yaw-win refers to
both the inseparability of body and spirit and an intimate connection between
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human life and the natural world.149 As opposed to the more limited Western
definition of wellness as “the state of being well or in good health,”150 the Cree
concept also extends to a balanced relationship with the natural environment.
Achieving mi-nah-yaw-win through the Cree dispute resolution process
necessitates the use of consensus decision-making, a common practice among
many indigenous peoples, including the Navajo in the United States. In the
Navajo judicial system, “the proper way to handle a dispute or a breach of the
peace [is] to give everyone who had any interest or knowledge of the matter a
chance to speak. Everyone’s input [is] taken into consideration. Justice [comes]
from the participation of all interested persons in resolving the problem and
restoring harmony.”151 The Cree have implemented this type of procedure as part
of their governing process, as is evident in their monthly General Assembly
meetings, their formulation of a community development plan, and their design of
a new government.152
B. Adaptation of Cree Government and Laws
As the Cree began to design their new government, they debated over
whether it should be based only on Cree customary law or should also integrate
Canadian and international legal norms. They decided that they needed a
government that followed the latter model, one that mediated between multiple
legal systems by adapting local laws to accommodate other legal norms. They
recognized that simply returning to customary practices was insufficient for
effective self-governance. A government based exclusively on customary law
would ignore the outside institutions that interact with contemporary Cree society.
In asserting their autonomy, the Cree realized that their government must be
recognized as legitimate by the Canadian government and the international
community, and that it must be capable of engaging in negotiations with them.
As Cree Chief John Miswagon explained: “Traditional ways provide the
framework; but we also need[ed] to catch up with more than a century of modern
governance. . . . We see sovereignty . . . as a matter of reconciliation. We seek to
harmonize the way we administer our laws with the administration of other
149
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Canadian laws.”153 Achieving legal validation from international and state
authorities would also educate those outside the community about Cree legal
norms and cultural practices.
The Cree’s written codification of laws exemplifies how they have
adapted their traditional legal norms to accommodate their new relationship with
outside institutions. Although their culture has a historically oral tradition, the
Cree began to write their laws down because “that’s the way the white man does
things and that’s the only way [the Cree] can convey [their] message to them.”154
Sandy Beardy, the former Chief of their Council of Elders, summarized the
necessity of documenting Cree laws: “We had our own laws before the Europeans
came, but now we’re writing them down so others won’t forget, in case later on
they try to take away our land from us again.”155 Thus, the Cree have recognized
that their contemporary relationship with the outside world requires that their laws
be accessible to and comprehensible by non-indigenous peoples. Written laws
facilitate communication with external governments and international bodies.
Based on the principle of inherent jurisdiction, the Cree ratified The First
Written Law in 1996, which laid the foundation for their adaptation of customary
practices.156 The law codifies oral Cree traditions to provide “improved
opportunity for Crown parties and others to comprehend the democratic (but
culturally different) concepts of Cree government.”157 It outlines the
constitutional powers of the Pimicikamak Cree Nation, including the new
government’s four council structure and its legislative procedures. According to
The First Written Law, the Cree government “is based on, and expands upon,
existing traditional law, . . . reconcil[ing] the [Canadian] Indian Act government
with inherent governance.”158 The integration of Indian Act entities, such as the
positions of Chief and Council, into the Cree’s customary political system reflects
the their creative accommodation of Canadian legal structures.
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The Cree have incorporated the legal entities of Chief and Council, which
did not exist in Cree tradition, to facilitate an orderly transition to selfgovernment. Their working paper, A New Relationship, explains why they have
retained these entities under The First Written Law:
[The First Written Law] expands upon [traditional law] because it comes
to terms with the (offensive) existence of and also the (practical) need for
Chief and Council as an executive arm of government. ‘Offensive’
because it was a violation of our human right of self-determination by
means of the Indian Act. . . . ‘Practical’ because the world has changed
much and normal evolution of Cree governance has been suppressed for
generations.159
At the same time, the Cree have altered the powers of Chief and Council in order
to reconcile them with their traditional political system. The Chief and Council
still represent the backbone of their government, with the power to initiate written
laws under their inherent jurisdiction. Yet, instead of following the Indian Act’s
delegation of all political power to the Chief and Council, the Cree have
redistributed some of their administrative authority to three traditional bodies, all
of which operate by consensus: the Council of Elders, the Women’s Council, and
the Youth Council. The Chief and Council form the executive branch of this new
four council system and conduct the day-to-day administrative affairs in
cooperation with the federal and provincial governments.
Following The First Written Law, the Cree have continued to pass
additional laws that adapt or replace provisions of the Indian Act. Chief
Miswagon noted that this process is incremental: “We are replacing [the Indian
Act] at our own pace, in our own way, with something that works for us.”160 To
date, they have adopted five laws according to this procedure—The First Written
Law, The Pimicikamak NFA Implementation Law, The Pimicikamak Okimawin
Trust and Hydro Payment Law, The Citizenship Law, and The Election Law—
and are in the process of drafting a Resource Management Law and Financial
Administration Law.161 The Citizenship Law and Election Law nullify federal
jurisdiction over citizenship and election procedures and redefine the membership
and voting criteria for the Cree, even incorporating the Canadian Supreme Court
Corbiere decision regarding the rights of off-reserve Indians.162 The Hydro
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Payment Law mandates that hydroelectric bill payments be placed in a trust,
instead of being paid to Manitoba Hydro, until the NFA is implemented according
to its spirit and intent. These local laws, which integrate Cree customary law with
Canadian legal concepts, permit the Cree to exercise authority over their
economic administration, membership, elections, and political institutions.
C. Incorporation of International Norms
Having been exposed to international human rights norms through their
political mobilization, the Cree began to incorporate these norms into both their
official discourse (e.g., their constitution, laws, and formal statements to external
parties) and their local political discourse. As part of their new constitution, the
Cree have included language from the U.N.’s International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and its International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights.163 They have also officially recognized that the authority of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms must apply “to every Law of [the Pimicikamak]
First Nation.”164 Finally, the Cree have adopted new laws and restructured their
government to protect individuals within their community, which represents the
first time that they have mandated the protection of the rights of historically
discriminated groups like women. This is a radical step for the Cree who, like
other indigenous peoples, have often focused on the protection of group rights
rather than individual rights.
The Cree assert the dual importance of individual and group rights in their
working paper, A New Relationship:
We have . . . rights as individuals and a people. . . . We intend from this
time onward to subject the conditions facing our people to ongoing human
rights scrutiny, as is entirely appropriate. . . . It is established that the
human rights of peoples and nations are the legitimate business of other
peoples and nations, and that any intervention concerning fundamental
human rights is not interference. We will continue to call on others,
including an international community, who are concerned with human
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rights to intervene to ensure that our human rights are respected (emphasis
added).165
They also recognize their obligation to prevent human rights violations within
other indigenous communities: “We also intend to take all legitimate steps to
ensure that the human rights of our brothers and sisters in our communities . . . are
respected. . . . It is our obligation to intervene and help to ensure that they are
restored and respected.”166 In this way, the Cree have codified certain
international human rights norms.
The Cree have particularly focused on the rights of women and youth in
the design of their four council government. While participating at U.N. human
rights meetings, Cree representatives heard the grievances of women’s and
children’s rights groups and reported their concerns back to their communities.
Empowered with the knowledge that they had internationally recognized rights,
women like Rita Monias, a member of the Cree’s Women’s Council, began to
educate themselves about human rights through Internet research and at the
library of a local university.167 Monias has observed that, prior to the formation
of their new government, people had criticized her for speaking about her rights
under international law.168 However, with the development of new laws and the
increased community awareness of international human rights norms, she had the
opportunity to realize those rights by lobbying for women to have more decisionmaking power.
As a result of lobbying activities by women, the Cree adjusted the
functions of the traditional councils under The First Written Law to give more
voice to women and youth. The law removes primary authority over law-making
from the Council of Elders and shifts the customary role of the Women’s Council
from an executive function to a legislative one that is more prominent in everyday
affairs. Whereas the Women’s Council formerly had only a consultative role in
the law-making process, it now has veto power over all laws and supervises
elections of the Chief and Council.169 The law also confers a legislative role on
the Youth Council, which traditionally lacked governing responsibilities.
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The Cree’s law-making process now consists of the following steps: (i) A
law is proposed by the Chief and Council. (ii) The law must be approved through
traditional consensus by the Council of Elders and the Women’s Council and be
referred to the Youth Council for consultation. The Council of Elders and
Women’s Council can also refer the law back to the Chief and Council with a
recommendation that it be amended before being reconsidered for approval. (iii)
The proposed law then requires public approval at a General Assembly meeting
held through consensus decision-making. If it is not approved, the law is referred
back to the Chief and Council for redrafting. (iv) The law and any amendments
made to it are adopted and signed by the Chief and Council. Under this new
legislative process, the three councils and the Cree citizens cooperate with the
Chief and Council in the formulation and approval of laws.
The prominent role of women in the current Cree administration has been
widely celebrated by community members who felt underrepresented by the
previous system. Many women have expressed their support for the new
government and its recognition of their rights, and have, as a result, increased
their participation in the political process. During a General Assembly meeting,
Patsy Corierre, a member of the Women’s Council, declared that the Cree’s latest
laws “are for the children, for the future generations. [The people] are finally
going in the right direction.”170 Women are now among the political leaders
determining the nation’s future, and they give credit to the international human
rights movement for influencing the structure of the new government.
The Youth Council’s increased political power reflects the growing
percentage of young people within the reservation, where about 50 percent of
residents are under the age of 20.171 Gerald Frogg, a former Youth Council
member and candidate for Council in the August 1999 election, expressed his
excitement for the enhanced opportunities for youth in the Cree government:
“Before, we were in the background, we never really got a chance to say much.
But since the new government, we have a lot of power. . . . We actually have a
say about the things that are going on in our community.”172 Although political
apathy still exists among many young residents, they are becoming more involved
as they realize their decision-making power under the new laws.
While international human rights norms, such as the rights of youth and
women, have become embedded in official legal documents, they are also starting
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to shape how law is talked about in local settings.173 Cree politicians have begun
to use the language of rights within their community when deliberating over their
local government. For instance, during the General Assembly meeting when the
Cree public voted on the proposed Election Law, Council representatives justified
the assertion of the Pimicikamak Cree Nation’s inherent jurisdiction by
distributing copies of the two U.N. international human rights covenants.174 They
explained the significance of international law as a foundation for their selfgovernment and educated the community on how they were seeking to realize
their rights. Politicians further appealed to the symbolic power of international
human rights discourse in the ensuing local election.
In preparation for their first election for Chief and Council administered
under the Election Law, the candidates invoked international human rights norms
as rhetorical devices in campaign slogans and televised speeches. Posters for the
reelection of Council member Nelson Miller featured the slogan: “Vote Nelson
Miller for strong self-determined PCN [Pimicikamak Cree Nation] governance
and human rights” (emphases added). The publicly distributed pamphlets for the
reelection of Chief Roland Robinson similarly alluded to international legal
principles in declaring Robinson’s support for “aboriginal, cultural, economic,
social, political, civil, and human rights.” In the debate among candidates for
Chief in 1999, Robinson argued that the Canadian government’s underfunding is
a violation of the Cree’s “fundamental human rights under the U.N. and the
Canadian charter rights.”175 Thus, the Cree are appropriating rights language to
secure not only external legitimacy for their incipient government but also its
acceptance within the community.
As rights language begins to penetrate the Cree’s laws and political
discourse, it may become vernacularized or “adapted to local institutions and
meanings.”176 In other words, the Cree may translate or redefine human rights
concepts in their everyday life in terms of existing cultural norms and values. In
my study, it was not yet clear whether the Cree are adopting international human
rights norms as simply a strategic weapon in their campaign against Canada or
whether the norms are truly becoming vernacularized. Further empirical research
is necessary to determine the degree to which international human rights norms
have become internalized in the Pimicikamak Cree Nation and have shaped their
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informal communications and everyday practice—e.g., whether the Cree have
begun to think about local grievances as human rights violations and whether they
would continue to use human rights language within their community if their
conflict with Canada were resolved.177 It is possible that norm internalization is
more of a continuum, ranging from formal adoption to vernacularization, and that
it may take years to determine at which point a community falls.178
D. The Limits of Legal Mediation
Having described the Cree’s government as a model of legal mediation, I
would like to now consider the limits of this model for the Cree and other local
communities. That is, what are the necessary conditions under which legal
mediation will most likely work? In what circumstances is this model not as
appropriate? Based on my study of the Pimicikamak Cree Nation and other
indigenous communities, I have identified two types of obstacles: external and
internal.
1. External Obstacles
The effectiveness of the legal mediation model is closely linked to state
cooperation. In order for local appeals to international law to be influential, state
governments must feel vulnerable to international pressure and care about their
public image. This approach works best in countries like Canada, a nation that
projects an image of protecting human rights and wants to be viewed as doing so
by the international community. Such countries are more willing to negotiate
with local communities and even adapt their laws to accommodate customary
norms. However, even countries like Canada, which have pledged their support
for indigenous self-government in official literature and public statements, have
been reluctant in taking actions to realize that pledge.179 This reluctance is
exemplified in Canada’s objections to the Cree’s recently adopted Election Law.
Canada did not protest the Cree’s emerging self-government process until
the passage of the Cree’s Election Law in June 1999. The law directly replaced
Section 74 of the Indian Act, which details the election procedures for indigenous
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communities, with provisions based on Cree customary norms.180 Their election
under the law was the first one held by a Canadian Indian nation to allow offreserve members the opportunity to vote, based on revised membership criteria
outlined in the Cree’s new Citizenship Law. The Indian Act prohibits off-reserve
Indians from the privileges granted to citizens, including the right to vote in
community elections. In addressing this issue, the Canadian Supreme Court
declared the Indian Act’s denial of voting rights for off-reserve residents as
unconstitutional.181 The Pimicikamak Cree cited this case when developing their
own citizenship provisions that recognize the status of off-reserve Indians.
Although Cree officials had pursued a process of open communication
with the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs in Winnipeg and Ottawa
during the months that they developed the Election Law, the federal government
rejected the legitimacy of their first election under this law and threatened not to
recognize the newly elected Chief. On August 19, 1999, the Canadian
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs issued a statement to the Cree
declaring its refusal to honor the results of the election due to a lack of “evidence
that the changes to [the Pimicikamak Cree Nation’s] election and membership act
were arrived at through a democratic process.”182 The Canadian government did
not believe that a majority of Cree electors had accepted the new election
procedures, despite the fact that the General Assembly had voted unanimously to
adopt the law on June 30, 1999, and a record number of people turned out to vote
at the August 17th election.
After intense pressure by the Pimicikamak Cree and other indigenous
groups in Canada, as well as by representatives from international human rights
NGOs, Canada decided in late September to recognize the new Election Law. It
realized the threat of negative international publicity if it refused to negotiate a
self-government arrangement. Granting this one concession by accepting the
Election Law of a small tribe in northern Manitoba was preferable to a long
drawn-out battle with the Cree, particularly given the resistance and international
attention that the Cree had brought against the federal government. This incident
illustrates how indigenous groups should continue to place international pressure
on their governments as they pursue an incremental strategy for self-government.
The Cree’s legal mediation approach demonstrates the level of success that can be
achieved against external obstacles if communities incrementally pass laws that
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replace aspects of federal law, incorporate international norms, and adapt local
norms, while continuing to participate in transnational advocacy networks.
2. Internal Obstacles
The second type of challenge to the legal mediation approach is internal.
A community may be divided over whether it should create a new government
based on local norms or whether it is more prudent to retain a state-imposed
government that does not borrow from local norms. This type of internal dispute
occurred among the Hopi, an American Indian nation in which a faction of
members have tried to reconcile their traditional norms with the current
government. Between 1948 and the late 1980s, a “traditionalist” movement
emerged on the Hopi reservation that was independent of the Hopi Tribal Council,
the governing institution recognized by the U.S. government and established by
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. This movement attempted to “create a
new political path that is the obverse of the U.S. government’s intrusion into Hopi
life and its creation of the Hopi Tribal Council.”183 Traditionalists embraced the
village-based Hopi governing structure, organized under the kikmongwis or
village chiefs, as the basis of their new leadership, and they attempted to
reorganize the Hopi political system.184
As a result of internal tension, two concurrent bodies were claiming
authority over the Hopi community: the Tribal Council (recognized by the United
States) and the traditional Hopi government. A power conflict developed between
Council leaders and traditionalists, creating many obstacles to community unity
and administrative efficiency. Factionalism caused the traditional village
leadership to become “marginalized and displaced from the political center stage
of tribal life.”185 Despite growing community support for the traditionalists’
preservation of Hopi culture, the Tribal Council remained the only conduit for
distributing U.S. government benefits. Yet, the Tribal Council was often unable
to establish a quorum “because traditional village leaders sometimes refuse[d] to
certify elected representatives.”186
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The Hopi case––featuring “acquiescence to the economic and political
system of the intrusive dominant European-derived culture on the one hand and,
on the other, phrased as traditionalism, an ideology of independence of, and scorn
for, the intruders and their system”187—offers several lessons to other local
communities, including the Pimicikamak Cree Nation. Jurisdictional
complications and internal conflicts similar to those in the Hopi community can
plague the self-government process. Notably different from the Cree case, the
Hopi traditionalists did not attempt to negotiate Hopi law with U.S. or
international law but instead strived to create a government based exclusively on
customary norms. Nonetheless, even within a government based on legal
mediation, internal factionalism may threaten its stability and the cultural
cohesiveness of the community. Moreover, if a group’s new political leadership
is unclear and contested, this may also decrease the likelihood that the state will
recognize the recently established local government.
Another possible internal challenge may emerge over what actually
constitute the “traditional” local norms that should form the basis of a new
government. This dispute occurred within the Pimicikamak Cree community, in
which there exist many different interpretations of customary law. As one Cree
representative has noted, “The Chief and Council say they are proud to be Cree,
but they don’t really know what it means to be Cree.”188 The process of adapting
customary practices into Cree local government depends on people’s consensus
over what they consider to be the local norms. While the entire community may
agree on the need to return to their traditional governing institutions, several key
questions must first be addressed: Who defines what is considered “traditional?”
Is there an objective set of customary norms? Such issues hinder groups who
want to present a united voice when seeking political autonomy.
Among the Cree, the debate over what procedures are considered
democratic according to traditional standards has heated up in recent years.189
There have been criticisms that the local government does not adequately model
its consensus decision-making procedures on those followed years ago by the
Cree, and that they are instead a production of non-native influences.190 The
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identification and interpretation of traditional norms has been primarily
determined by the political representatives from the four governing councils,
leading to frustration among the general public and lower-ranked employees in
the tribal government. Thus, in order to address these internal challenges, it is
important for groups like the Cree to continuously engage in consultations with
the rest of the community and to make efforts to include them in the political
decision-making process.
CONCLUSION
Legal mediation presents a model for how local communities can integrate
international and state norms into their legal institutions while also adapting local
laws and practices. I argue that indigenous communities like the Pimicikamak
Cree Nation are engaging in legal mediation as they negotiate among multiple
normative commitments. While mobilizing an international campaign for selfdetermination, the Cree have joined transnational advocacy networks and become
familiar with international human rights norms. Their new government mediates
between different legal systems by borrowing from Canadian and international
law and adapting cultural norms and customary practices.
This ethnographic study seeks to contribute to international legal
scholarship on norm diffusion by examining the local process by which
international norms are adopted. Legal mediation explains how international
norms can become embedded in local communities and interact with customary
and state norms. It builds on theories of legal pluralism by offering a model of
how local communities can accommodate multiple legal systems. Yet, it also
extends existing frameworks by focusing not just on the interaction of legal orders
but also on the adaptation of local norms and the shaping of local law-making in
the process of integrating state and international norms.
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This model is only one way in which legal mediation can operate with
respect to international norms. Local communities are not the only actors that can
initiate contact with international norms; states may also do so. For example,
states can invoke international norms in an attempt to hold local communities up
to international legal standards. They can leverage international pressure against
communities whose cultural practices or religious laws fail to abide by
international human rights norms, such as women’s rights. In such instances,
states invoke international law to influence local norms, or at least seek to end
practices they deem as violating universal human rights. Local communities are
then under great pressure to engage in legal mediation and to adapt local norms to
comply with international standards. Unlike in the form of legal mediation that I
discuss in this article, local actors in such situations are not the key players in
shaping how international norms get internalized within their communities. They
have much less influence in determining how local customs and laws will be
negotiated since they are under pressure by states and international human rights
groups.
One must therefore consider the power relations between the local,
national, and global legal systems, and how the process of legal mediation can be
strategically employed by either local actors or states. There are also power
inequalities among states such that some states are more receptive to international
pressure and to a legal mediation model than are others. Such factors reveal the
constantly changing interaction between multiple normative communities and
suggest diverse models of legal mediation.
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